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Japan’s Kissinger? Yachi Shōtarō: 
The State Behind the Curtain
Giulio Pugliese
Abstract1
This article reassesses the 2006 and, tentatively, the 2014 reset in Sino-
Japanese relations to argue in favour of an increasingly state-centric 
understanding of Japanese diplomacy. By making use of a narrative 
account and a variety of primary sources—including personal memoirs, 
elite interviews, participatory observation, and leaked State Department 
cables—this article finds that Abe Shinzō’s foreign policy confidante, 
Yachi Shōtarō, embodied the unmatched influence of government actors 
in Japan’s political landscape. The article provides a close-up portrait of 
Yachi, with an emphasis on his preference for geopolitics, strategy, and 
secret diplomacy. Yachi and the institutional apparatus he represented 
sought détente with Japan’s main strategic adversary, while pushing for 
geopolitical initiatives that targeted China. The article concludes by arguing 
that the Abe administration’s insistence on, and institutionalized practice of, 
conducting public affairs in secret will likely further strengthen the role of 
the nation-state and of government actors in Japan, also in light of growing 
geopolitical tensions in East Asia.
Keywords: Japan-China relations, Yachi Shōtarō, Japanese foreign policy 
making, secret diplomacy, strategy, Yasukuni Shrine
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2017902231
1. Introduction: Informal Actors Take the Lead?
Globalization has added a substantial degree of complexity to world affairs. Yet, recent trends in international politics, exemplified in 2016 and 2017 by the return of identity politics, nativist populism, 
and charismatic leadership, demonstrate the nation-state’s comeback. This 
article complicates this picture to argue that the nation-state and elite policy 
Giulio Pugliese is a lecturer in War Studies, King’s College London. He is a member of Asia Maior, 
an Italian think tank on Asian affairs, and has recently co-authored a book with Aurelio Insisa entitled 
Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
Email: giulio.pugliese@kcl.ac.uk
1  The author is particularly grateful for the support received by Barak Kushner during his PhD, 
including letters of reference and introductions, and would like to thank Professor Hugo Dobson, 
Caroline Rose, Glenn Hook, Matsuoka Misato, and the other participants in the Informal Political 
Actors in Japan Workshop, 15–16 January 2016. The author also appreciates the input provided by 
Dr. John Nilsson-Wright. While the information presented is not sensitive, the author has opted for 
anonymizing most of the interview subjects.
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makers have consistently been central to the conduct of public affairs, and 
their influence has increased well before the crisis of globalization. After all, 
post-Cold War Sino-Japanese relations have grown increasingly complex, 
thus augmenting the impact of Japanese domestic politics and informal 
actors in bilateral relations.2 Prima facie, the increased relevance of non-state 
actors has dispelled state-centred realist appreciations of Japan’s China 
policy.3 In fact, scholars and practitioners have often stressed the constructive 
role played by a variety of informal and non-state actors in the management 
of Japan-China relations: emphasizing functional cooperation advanced by 
region-wide epistemic communities;4 underlining the logic of integration 
through people-to-people exchanges and cultural proximity;5 envisioning 
deepened economic engagement due to Japanese enterprises’ lobbying on 
the basis of substantial interests in the Chinese market;6 or stressing the 
proactive role of sub-state actors and Japanese non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in soothing bilateral relations, possibly as a tool of 
Japanese soft power in China.7 Reflecting the nature of this understanding, 
the literature came to appreciate the formative role of informal actors in 
bringing about the easing of tensions between Japan and China.
Notably, in 2006 and in 2014 the two governments demonstrated 
engagement in easing bilateral political tensions. Earlier the bone of 
contention was prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. More recently, 
the standoff over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been chiefly 
responsible for souring bilateral political relations to their lowest point since 
the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. Yet, as an indication of 
Japan’s complex domestic sociopolitical landscape, the literature diluted the 
relevance of formal political actors to focus, instead, on the inherently 
postmodern quality to Japan’s polity and values at the end of the Cold War, 
a trait also highlighted by influential Japanese scholars with particular 
reference to Japan’s pacifism.8 Some scholars focused on Diet members and 
“friendship diplomacy” as the loci for improving relations at the leadership 
level in 2006. Karol Żakowski’s research on Diet members’ diplomacy between 
2  Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015).
3  Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: foreign policy challenges in an era of uncertain power 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001).
4  Kent Calder and Min Ye, The Making of Northeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010).
5  Utpal Vyas, “Japan’s international NGOs: a small but growing presence in Japan-China 
relations,” Japan Forum 22, no. 3–4 (2010): 467–490.
6  Jitsurō Terashima, Sekai o shiru chikara [The Power to Know the World] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 
2010).
7  Akio Takahara, “Japanese NGOs in China,” in Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising 
Power, ed. Peng-Er Lam (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 166–179.
8  Akihiko Tanaka, Atarashii chūsei [The New Middle Ages] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 
1996); Shin’ichi Kitaoka, Gurōbaru pureiyā to shite no Nippon [Japan as a Global Player] (Tokyo: NTT 
Shuppan, 2010), 17–19.
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Yachi Shōtarō: The State Behind the Curtain
2001 and 2012 has shown that during major diplomatic crises, the Japanese 
and Chinese governments were able to maintain solid channels of 
communication through informal political “pipelines” hailing from the 
ruling parties.9 Caroline Rose came to similar conclusions specific to the 
2006 track II missions undertaken by Japanese Diet members in China.10 
Specific to the actual leverage of Japanese politicians over Abe Shinzō’s 2006 
overtures to China, Cheung suggests that Abe conceded on visits to the 
Yasukuni in exchange for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
establishment’s support, an ambiguous change of heart dictated by political 
survival.11 Politicians sympathetic to China have traditionally played a role 
in the management of Sino-Japanese relations and their input seemed 
significant in 2006. They are important informal political actors who have 
considerably smoothed Japan-China relations throughout the postwar years.
In the early twenty-first century, the very functionalism and deepening 
ties between Japan and China implied not only the rise of regional production 
networks and economic interdependence, but also deepening epistemic 
communities among policy makers and intellectuals, who may often exert a 
considerable influence in policy making.12 According to this logic, people-
to-people cooperation functioned on its own merits, as evidenced by the 
networking quality of venues such as the Boao Forum of Asia.13 This China-
sponsored venue testified, after all, to quiet diplomacy between Fukuda Yasuo 
and his Chinese counterparts already in 2013.14 With regard to the 2014 
détente, former prime minister Fukuda Yasuo—a politician traditionally 
understood as sympathetic to China—was key to amending ties between the 
conservative Abe and Xi Jinping governments, seemingly corroborating the 
above scholarly claims, as well as an original appreciation for former prime 
ministers’ diplomacy.15
Finally, NGOs have also facilitated the resumption of Japan-China 
dialogue. The Tokyo-Beijing Forum—inaugurated in 2005 by the Japanese 
non-profit organization Genron NPO—is often appreciated among scholars 
and practitioners as a harbinger of a new era of diplomacy, one that Genron 
NPO’s leader does not hesitate in calling a “new civil diplomacy,” or a 
9  Karol Żakowski, “Nihon no taichū giin gaikō: 2001–2012nen” [Japan’s Diet Members China 
Diplomacy: 2001–2012], Keiō University Presentation, field notes and readout graciously provided 
by Dr. Karol Żakowski, 18 June 2013.
10  Caroline Rose, “Sino-Japanese Relations after Koizumi and the Limits of New-Era Diplomacy,” 
in China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, ed. Christopher Dent (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2008), 52–66.
11  Mong Cheung, “Political survival and the Yasukuni controversy in Sino-Japanese relations,” 
The Pacific Review 23, no. 4 (2010): 527–548.
12  Misato Matsuoka, “Cultural Hegemony and the Role of Intellectuals in Japanese Foreign 
Policy,” Informal Political Actors in Japan Workshop, 15–16 January 2016, Baslow Hall, United Kingdom.
13  Calder and Ye, The Making of Northeast Asia, 129–157.
14  “Fukuda, Xi plan second meeting at Boao Forum in Beijing,” Japan Times, 25 October 2014.
15  Hugo Dobson and Caroline Rose, “Former Prime Ministers as Foreign Policy Actors,” Informal 
Political Actors in Japan Workshop, 15–16 January 2016.
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“discussion-based diplomacy.”16 Did informal actors, such as Diet members, 
non-governmental actors, and epistemic-communities diplomacy, pave the 
way for Sino-Japanese political rapprochement in 2006?
Events leading to the 2006 détente seemingly validate the agency of 
informal political actors. Diet members’ groups sustained the bottom-up 
diplomatic push for a resumption of bilateral ties. In 2006 the “Japan-China 
Ruling Coalition Exchange Association” was the most prominent such group 
and it paved the way for bilateral communication; importantly, LDP Policy 
Research Council chairman, Nakagawa Hidenao, led the Japanese delegation. 
Nakagawa was an influential and conservative representative who acted as 
“guardian” to then Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, the most likely politician to 
succeed Koizumi Junichirō to the premiership in late summer 2006. 17 Several 
interviews testified to the incubator role Nakagawa played in resetting China 
and Japan relations precisely because of his conservative colours and the Abe 
link. 18 The first LDP-New Komeito (NK) ruling coalition visit to Beijing in 
February 2006 was symptomatic of China’s initial indisposition against the 
conservative camp, because Chinese counterparts preferred relating to old 
China hands, such as Nikai Toshihiro.19 By mid-summer 2006, however, 
Nakagawa would arrange an informal meeting between Chief Cabinet 
Secretary (CCS) Abe and Chinese counterparts that included Ambassador 
Wang Yi.20 While it is hard to state with certainty whether specific promises 
were made over Yasukuni Shrine visits, the meeting provided the first, covert 
reassurance that Koizumi’s successor was on board the bilateral reset.
A public indication of the working-level agreement came at the Genron 
NPO Tokyo-Beijing Forum of 3 August 2006, when Kudō Yasushi remembered 
Ambassador Wang Yi’s confident premonitory words prior to CCS Abe’s 
surprise visit: “we are going to make history today.”21 To the astonishment 
of a noted China scholar present there, Abe would read a surprisingly 
conciliatory speech that stressed the importance of bilateral relations.22 In 
16  Yasushi Kudō, Genron gaikō: Higashi Ajia ni okeru kadai kaiketsu no tame no atarashii minkan gaikō 
[Discussion-based Diplomacy: East Asia’s New Civil Diplomacy for Resolving Problems] (Tokyo: NC 
Communication, 2014).
17  “Koizumi-go e, Nicchū shidō Nikai Keisanshō-ra kaidan” [Towards the Post-Koizumi Era: 
Japan and China Make their Moves—METI Minister Nikai and Others Meet for Talks], Asahi Shinbun, 
23 February 2006, 3.
18  Person involved in arranging the Abe-Wang meeting under condition of anonymity, tape 
recording, Tokyo, 2013; person involved in arranging the Abe-Wang meeting under condition of 
anonymity, tape recording, Tokyo, 2013.
19  “Koizumi-go e, Nicchū shidō Nikai Keisanshō-ra kaidan.”
20  Person involved in arranging the Abe-Wang meeting under condition of anonymity, tape 
recording, Tokyo, 2013; person involved in arranging the Abe-Wang meeting under condition of 
anonymity, tape recording, Tokyo, 2013.
21  Head of Genron NPO Kudō Yasushi, tape recording, Tokyo, 3 September 2013.
22  Shinzō Abe, “Giron to taiwa de, pātonā no kankei ni haguruma wo ugokasō” [Let’s Change 
Gear in Bilateral Relations through Debates and Dialogue], in Dai 2 Kai Tōkyō-Beijing Fōramu – 2006nen 
Tōkyō [The Second Tokyo-Beijing Forum—2006 Tokyo], ed. Genron NPO (Tokyo: Genron NPO, 
2006): 16–17; Japanese scholar, tape recording, Tokyo, 11 January 2013; high-ranking MOFA official, 
tape recording, Tokyo, 24 June 2013.
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Yachi Shōtarō: The State Behind the Curtain
plain sight, Diet members’ diplomacy and the Japanese think-tank showcased 
signs of the forthcoming bilateral reset.
This paper argues against the literature emphasizing the relative and 
increasing impact of informal actors in Japanese foreign policy making. 
Instead, it demonstrates how state agencies acted as kuromaku: those who act 
behind the scenes in Japanese theatre, setting the stage and assisting the actors 
in full view of the audience. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats 
accompanied the “Japan-China Ruling Coalition Exchange Association” 
delegations and often wrote the script and registered the interactions between 
Japanese and Chinese representatives from the ruling parties. Similarly, the 
overtures witnessed in summer 2006 were carefully choreographed by MOFA. 
Prior even to Abe becoming prime minister, evidence proves that selected 
MOFA kuromaku devised the so-called “ambiguous strategy” that aimed at 
depoliticizing the Yasukuni Shrine issue.23 In fact, the speech read by Abe at 
the Genron NPO venue was crafted by MOFA strategist Akiba Takeo, the then 
newly appointed head of the China and Mongolia Division.24 Selected people 
from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the lead in setting the scene for 
the 2006 détente, to the point that it was Administrative Vice-Minister “Yachi 
Shōtarō who oversaw everything.”25
Within MOFA, Yachi led Tokyo’s back-channel overtures to China. It was 
Yachi and his task force who devised creative ways to put the Yasukuni Shrine 
issue on the backburner through an ambiguous “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy 
that successfully saved face for both Japanese and Chinese leaders.26 
Moreover, preliminary evidence indicates that Yachi carefully selected trusted, 
and skilled, diplomats specifically to deal with China: for instance, Akiba was 
neither an “Asianist” nor a “China-school” diplomat traditionally sensitive 
to Chinese remonstrations on the history issue. According to one author, 
Yachi appointed the “American School” diplomat to the unusual position 
in 2006 to advance a new China strategy.27 The China task force would also 
work on quiet, but key, bilateral negotiations with Ambassador Wang and 
State Councillor Dai Bingguo, because they enjoyed the trust of China’s 
heads of government, like Yachi did with Japan’s equivalents.28 Yachi and Dai 
inaugurated these secretive meetings as early as mid-2005,29 and they would 
23  High-ranking MOFA official, tape recording, Tokyo, 24 June 2013.
24  Japanese scholar, tape recording, Tokyo, 11 January 2013; High-ranking MOFA official, written 
notes, Tokyo, 4 August 2014.
25  High-ranking MOFA official, written notes, Tokyo, 4 August 2014.
26  High-ranking MOFA official, tape recording, Tokyo, 24 June 2013; high-ranking MOFA official, 
tape recording, Tokyo, 22 July 2013; high-ranking MOFA official, written notes, Tokyo, 4 August 2014. 
27  Giulio Pugliese, “Kantei Diplomacy? Japan’s Hybrid Leadership in Foreign and Security Policy,” 
The Pacific Review 30, no. 2 (2017): 152–168.
28  Yūji Miyamoto, Korekara Chūgoku to dō tsukiauka [How to Confront China from Now On?], 
(Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha, 2011), 136–181; interview with scholar, tape recording, 
Tokyo, 11 July 2013.
29  Shōtarō Yachi, Gaikō no senryaku to kokorozashi: zen gaimu jimu jikan Yachi Shōtarō wa kataru 
[The Aims and Ambitions of Diplomacy: Former Administrative Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Yachi Shōtarō Speaks Out] (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun Shuppan, 2009), 33–40.
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eventually set the stage for the late 2006 rapprochement. The state was very 
much in command of Japanese overtures to China, while informal actors 
were ancillary to state-led initiatives.
Along these lines, this article advances a Yachi-centred picture of Tokyo’s 
overtures to China to reassess the role of informal actors in Japanese policy 
making. After preparing the groundwork for geopolitical overtures aimed 
at China, a Yachi-led foreign policy executive promoted bilateral summit 
diplomacy. In other words, Tokyo pursued a sterner policy against Beijing 
in order to negotiate from a position of strength the terms of the “Japan-
China Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic 
Interests.” Following Abe’s comeback and the flare up of the post-2012 
Senkaku/Diaoyu standoff, Abe advanced the same strategy to tame a more 
assertive China and return to a semblance of the Japan-China Mutually 
Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests. This article 
presents this strategy as the offspring of Yachi’s geopolitical vision and further 
demonstrates that Yachi has been in the driver’s seat of Japan-China 
negotiations leading to the 2006 Sino-Japanese détente. The article details 
Yachi’s influence in paving Abe’s way to summit diplomacy with the Chinese 
leadership, and closes with a brief, preliminary reassessment of the road to 
the very timid détente of 2014.
2. Methodology
Most of the interviews presented took place between September 2012 and 
August 2014, and they were semi-structured, through carefully prepared 
“interview guides.” At the same time, interviews were open-ended to tackle 
the interviewees’ knowledge and flow of thoughts.30 Apart from gathering 
information on institutional and individual behaviour, face-to-face interviews 
were used to reconstruct the reasons and intentions of Yachi, because “the 
foreign policy behaviour of states depends on how individuals with power 
perceive and analyze situations.”31 Along with Carlsnaes’ framework, the 
explanation of Tokyo’s China policy necessarily starts from the interpretation 
of the motivations, preferences, and intentions of the leading foreign and 
security policy makers under scrutiny: the so-called ideational dimension.32 
The basic aim will be to interpret the foreign policy actor’s motivations and 
explain, also by citing previous works, the political process behind the 
Japanese government’s China policy. To that end, this interpretative approach 
30  Linus Hagström, Japan’s China Policy: A relational power analysis (Abingdon, Oxon: 2005), 
76–77.
31  Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford; 
New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1990), 74.
32  Walter Carlsnaes, “Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Foreign Policy: Theories, 
Actors, Cases, eds. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 97–99, 85–100.
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Yachi Shōtarō: The State Behind the Curtain
adopts detailed descriptions and the humility proper of historical accounts. 
As understood by Gaddis, process-tracing and historical narratives qualify as 
a useful common ground for political science and history “to extract 
generalities from unique sequences of events.”33 Moreover, the 
conceptualization of Japan’s China policy and of Japanese leadership in 
foreign policy making is quintessentially Weberian: ideal types, or concepts 
such as those provided by international relations theory (i.e., balancing, 
engagement, containment, etc.), are “ultimately heuristic devices able to 
highlight patterns or phenomena to which we attach a particular interest or 
meaning.”34 The echoes of recent Sino-Japanese history, highlighted in this 
article, may prove as valuable as political science’s “predictive” toolkit in 
understanding bilateral relations at the time of writing.
Finally, Yachi’s preferred policies and ideological preferences are based 
on the author’s close scrutiny of publicized primary sources: manifestos, 
memoirs, and policy articles. At the same time, their content was not taken 
at face value since they are often self-serving in nature. For this reason, these 
sources have undergone triangulation with additional primary sources, such 
as leaked State Department cables, interviews, and participatory observation 
with Ambassador Yachi. Extensive fieldwork allowed the author to participate 
in Yachi Shōtarō’s joint courses for Waseda, Keiō, and Tokyo University 
students in the autumn of 2012, months prior to Abe’s unexpected comeback. 
While such interaction was limited to participation in six gatherings, this 
study has benefitted greatly from this access.
3. Yachi Shōtarō: Japan’s Kissinger?
Yachi was Foreign Minister (FM) Asō Tarō and Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe’s 
leading diplomatic advisor. After becoming prime minister, Abe confirmed 
Asō as foreign minister and Yachi as MOFA’s top bureaucrat: administrative 
vice-minister (AVM). It is worth noting that, precisely with Yachi’s 2005 
appointment, Japan’s AVMs would turn into key strategic players with 
substantial leverage in policy formulation, personnel appointments, and, 
quite unusually, the first-hand conduct of diplomacy.35 Yet, Yachi epitomized 
such a hyper-empowered bureaucrat as AVM in 2005 to 2007, but also as 
cabinet counsellor and head of the National Security Secretariat following 
Abe’s comeback in 2012. Yachi’s authority was indicative of his deep bond 
of trust with Abe, who prided himself on his presidential leadership style. 
The Abe-Yachi bond originated from a shared appreciation of power politics. 
33  John Lewis Gaddis, “History, Theory, and Common Ground,” International Security 22, no. 1 
(Summer 1997): 75–85.
34  Elisabetta Brighi, Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and International Relations: The Case of Italy 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 5.
35  Ryō Nakamura, MOFA director of the Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, tape 
recording, Tokyo, 12 September 2013.
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As argued elsewhere, their leadership style, their worldview, and their active 
engagement in foreign and security policy resemble the relationship between 
Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. In contrast 
to the famous US proponents of a strategic realpolitik, their Japanese 
equivalents added to that an idealism, albeit of a different intensity, that was 
preoccupied with the recovery of Japan’s lost pride and sense of purpose.
3.1. Yachi and the Respect for Wakaizumi Kei
Yachi is a conservative idealist. His writings and first-hand accounts betray 
his uneasiness in the regimented world of Japanese bureaucracy. Direct 
testimonies from one US-Japan alliance handler, who has known Yachi for 
a long time, substantiate that he stood out from the MOFA crowd early in 
his foreign policy career, given his strategic vision and appreciation for 
security issues.36 After all, Yachi shared an important similarity with Abe, a 
will rooted in traditional notions of honour and sincerity (magokoro, i.e., a 
man who honestly follows his obligations), which he explicitly linked to his 
mentor’s role model, Wakaizumi Kei (see below). He sensed his job entailed 
grave responsibilities for the sake of the country’s security and prosperity, 
and these needed to be pursued consistently without abandoning personal 
conservative ideals. This romanticized right-wing idealism is evident from 
Yachi’s reference to the Buddhist paradise, where he aims at winning his 
father’s approval for responding to Japan’s call of duty as the country’s first-
ever head of the National Security Secretariat;37 it is also evident from Yachi’s 
sad dreams of young kamikaze pilots headed for suicidal missions. That those 
dreams moved Yachi to the point he entertained the possibility of being the 
reincarnation of a kamikaze pilot implies that he has a markedly more value-
laden (and conservative) definition of the “national interest,” a recurring 
word in his small book of memoirs.38 Unlike the original Kissinger, who would 
establish the successful and influential advisory and networking company 
Kissinger and Associates, Yachi’s decision to head the NSS was at the expense 
of a lucrative business career.39 That is, a self-denying commitment drove 
Yachi’s career as a public servant.
Not unlike Abe’s right-wing idealism, Yachi was perfectly conscious that 
his views placed him in the minority in the stiffly risk-adverse Japanese 
establishment. Also for this reason, he embarked on an active reconstruction 
of his personal legacy following his retirement from MOFA in 2007. He did 
so through active engagement in political debate, but also by holding 
36  Former high-ranking US foreign policy official, written notes, Tokyo, 22 July 2013.
37  Toshikawa Takao, “Sonzaikan fuyasu Yachi kokka anzen hoshō kyokuchō: Obama Seiken no 
irei no kōgū” [The Growing Reach of Yachi, Head of National Security Secretariat: Unprecedented 
Treatment from the Obama Administration], Yūkan Fuji: Nagatachō – Kasumigaseki Insaido, 28 January 
2014, (www.zakzak.co.jp/smp/society/politics/news/20140128/plt1401280736001-s.htm), accessed 
on 18 February 2017.
38  Yachi, Gaikō no senryaku to kokorozashi: zen gaimu jimu jikan Yachi Shōtarō wa kataru, 1–3; 23–27.
39  Scholar specializing in the politics of the Asia-Pacific, written notes, Tokyo, 12 June 2015.
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seminars for mostly young bureaucratic-cadre prospects hailing from three 
of Japan’s most prestigious universities (see above). In fact, Yachi was attracted 
to international politics and area studies from his university years and flirted 
with the idea of doing academic research. Instead, he was convinced by 
leading and secretive scholar Wakaizumi Kei to join MOFA. Lodging at 
Wakaizumi’s house for roughly one year, Yachi would learn the ropes and 
the sense of purpose behind the management of Japan’s foreign policy and 
diplomacy without abandoning a sense of inadequacy regarding the 
diplomatic elite.40 Similar to the ideological continuum between Abe and 
Kishi Nobusuke, Wakaizumi acted almost as a father-like figure to Yachi and 
it is worth shedding light on him.
Wakaizumi Kei was Prime Minister Satō Eisaku’s secret envoy to Washington, 
DC in 1969, to negotiate the reversion of Okinawa and the secretly agreed 
transit of US nuclear weapons to the archipelago at times of emergency.41 
Wakaizumi was a somewhat influential academic, with extensive ties to US 
government officials, who was driven both by a geopolitical realism informed 
by the logic of balancing and a need to restore a sense of purpose to postwar 
Japan’s embattled spirit.42 According to him, Japan had to reassert prominence 
in the Asia Pacific, especially through its sea power. In the early 1990s he 
would reveal the secret negotiations with Kissinger and Nixon as a means to 
make his countrymen realize that they were living in a “fools’ paradise” (gusha 
no rakuen) characterized by insular pacifism and over-reliance on US military 
protection in a potentially very dangerous post-Cold War environment. 
According to Yachi, his mentor’s “suicide” in 1996—a consequence of 
Wakaizumi’s decision to let a fatal illness take its natural course43—was less a 
consequence of LDP and policy officials’ denial and criticism over his 
revelations of the “secret agreements,” than his dismay in not being able to 
“ignite” (hi o tsukeru) the younger generation with his vision of Japan.44 In 
other words, Yachi understood Japan as an “abnormal” country.
Wakaizumi saw himself as a realist. In this regard, he was similar to another 
prominent Japanese scholar, Kōsaka Masataka. Kōsaka had made his 
reputation in 1964 with a path-breaking essay, “On Prime Minister Yoshida 
Shigeru,” that detailed Yoshida’s early decision to focus on economic growth 
40  Yachi, Gaikō no senryaku to kokorozashi: zen gaimu jimu jikan Yachi Shōtarō wa kataru, 15–22.
41  Wakaizumi Kei, The best course available: a personal account of the secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa reversion 
negotiations, ed. John Swenson-Wright, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
42  Shōtarō Yachi and Teshima Ryūichi, “Taidan Okinawa kaku mitsuyaku wa Beikoku no wana 
datta no ka? Wakaizumi Kei ga jisatsu shite made” [A Conversation: The Secret Nuclear Agreement 
in Okinawa was an American Trap? Until Wakaizumi’s Suicide] Chūō Kōron 125, no. 9 (September 
2010): 38–49; Shōtarō Yachi, “Wakaizumi Kei ‘tsuyoi Nihon - yowai Shina’ kara ‘tsuyoi Chūgoku - yowai 
Nihon’ ni (tekichū shita yogen)” [Wakaizumi Kei’s Correct Prediction: from a Strong Japan-Weak 
China to a Strong China-Weak Japan] Bungei Shunjū 88 (10 August): 285–287.
43  Romano Vulpitta, disciple of Wakaizumi Kei, e-mail correspondence, 12 March 2016.
44  Shōtarō Yachi and Teshima Ryūichi, “Taidan Okinawa kaku mitsuyaku wa Beikoku no wana 
datta no ka? Wakaizumi Kei ga jisai shite made.”
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at the expense of traditional power politics, the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine/
line.”45 However, unlike Kōsaka, Wakaizumi was critical of Japan’s 
emasculation arising from Yoshida’s preoccupation with economic issues. 
For both Wakaizumi and his disciple, Yachi, finding a means to bolster Japan’s 
autonomy by promoting a new national security strategy for the country 
became a key element of their professional careers. In this endeavour, their 
thinking closely paralleled the ideological emphasis of both Kishi and Abe, 
who were driven by a desire to outgrow the Yoshida line straightjacket, a 
preoccupation that figured highly in the Abe agenda and the LDP’s anti-
mainstream nationalist camp.
Thus, Wakaizumi informed the formulation of the 1977 “Fukuda 
Doctrine,” named after conservative Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo’s policy 
declaration.46 Said “doctrine” contained a defined policy compass that aimed 
at outgrowing the passivity of the postwar Yoshida line. While holding to a 
solid US-Japan alliance, Japan would have developed a “heart-to-heart” 
understanding of the region, to mark a re-entry in Asia. In order to do so, 
Japan would have increased its economic presence, but also its cultural 
diplomacy and political profile.47 Fukuda’s foreign policy line came to be 
known as “omnidirectional peace diplomacy” (zenhōi heiwa gaikō), and ought 
not to be confused with “equidistant diplomacy” (tōkyori gaikō), because it 
was still premised on the primacy of US-Japan relations. Wakaizumi crafted 
the precepts of omnidirectional peace diplomacy, because he appreciated 
the US-Soviet détente as a mainstay of international affairs back in the mid-
1970s.48 Later on, his disenchantment with the post-Cold War environment 
would influence the policy outlook of Yachi. Mounting security threats and 
a similar nationalistic fire kept Wakaizumi’s protégé striving for a new Japan 
that more autonomously responded to nascent security challenges across 
the archipelago’s shores. China’s military rise was the leading challenge.
3.2. Yachi’s Ideological Axes: History and Geopolitics
Yachi is driven by a geopolitically informed brand of power politics and the 
recovery of prestige. Direct testimonies and participatory observation point 
at the formative role played by the ideas of late Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko, 
a noted diplomat and analyst who appreciated the merits of military might 
as a tool of statecraft.49 Yachi explicitly and recurrently posits the pursuit of 
45  Kōsaka Masataka, Kaiyō kokka nihon no kōsō [A Vision of Japan as a Maritime Power], Chūkō 
Kurasshikkusu (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2008).
46  Andrea Pressello, “The Fukuda Doctrine and Japan’s Role in Shaping Post-Vietnam War 
Southeast Asia,” Japanese Studies 34, no. 1 (2014): 37–59.
47  Sueo Sudō, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: new dimensions in Japanese foreign policy (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), 152–156.
48  Yoshihiko Morita, Hyōden Wakaizumi Kei [Wakaizumi Kei: A Critical Biography] (Tokyo: 
Bunshun, 2011), 232–245.
49  “Yachi juku” [Yachi-led courses], Tokyo University Komaba Campus, participatory observation 
and written notes, 20 October 2012; Professor Nakanishi Terumasa, tape recording, Kyoto, 14 April 
2014; Hisahiko Okazaki, Kokusai jōsei handan hanseiki [English title: A Half-Century on the Frontline 
of International Affairs] (Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2015).
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the national interest as the ultimate driver of Japan’s foreign policy, and 
complained about the lack of strategic thinking in foreign policy circles. 
According to him, strategy must be built upon the clear understanding of 
two pivotal axes: history and geopolitics. The first refers to the deleterious 
“feeling of dependency on the United States” (Beikoku e no izon-shin), which 
must be substituted with a sense of equality and cooperation built upon 
shared values and interests. An appreciation for “a rather generous” (kanari 
no teido kanyōna) American occupation favouring postwar Japan’s very 
democratic system, economic growth, and security, need not have created a 
sense of dependency. Rather, Japan’s noble historical impulse towards 
independence ought to be recovered, but not at the expense of or against 
its security partner.50
With regard to geopolitics, China is prominent in Yachi’s reasoning. Yachi 
presents a traditional conservative realist appreciation of international 
politics, with explicit appreciation for the writings of scholars and practitioners 
such as E.H. Carr, Henry Kissinger, Okazaki, prewar British diplomat Harold 
Nicolson, and Robert Kagan.51 Yachi cites the founding fathers of 
geopolitics—Alfred Mahan, Harold MacKinder, and Nicholas Spykman—and 
points at Japan’s unchangeable geographical location and its role as a sea 
power, whose safeguard of the “rimland” is being confronted by China, a 
land power advancing into the oceans. According to Yachi, Japan needed to 
deepen its Trans-Pacific alliance and build a framework of cooperation with 
democratic “rimland” powers, especially naval ones. Said network would 
hold back China’s growing reach over the Eurasian “heartland” that would 
lead, instead, to world domination.52 Such bleak geopolitical appreciation 
propels Yachi’s forceful China balancing.
Yachi’s take on the nature of China matches his geopolitical apprehension. 
According to him, China’s national character is imbued with a wounded 
pride, where force needs to be applied for the restoration of honour following 
the “Century of Humiliation.” Hence, as China becomes the world’s second-
largest military power following the US, it is understandable that its behaviour 
becomes expansionist and aggressive. He then points to China’s traditional 
vertical vision of the world based upon the sinocentric order, and at China’s 
contradictory one-party dictatorship as lacking any set of principles and 
values that have appeal to other states. This, he remarks, is the greatest reason 
why China lacks legitimacy as a leader in international society. He then notes 
that economic growth cannot be the sole source of legitimacy and that the 
50  Shōtarō Yachi et al., “Sōkatsu zadankai—sōgōteki nichibei anzen hoshō kyōryoku ni mukete” 
[Closing Debate—Towards a Comprehensive Japan-U.S. Security Partnership], in Nippon no gaikō to 
sōgōteki anzen hoshō [Japan’s Diplomacy and Comprehensive Security], ed. Shōtarō Yachi (Tokyo: 
Wedge, 2015), 392–393; 388–454.
51  “Yachi juku,” participatory observation and written notes, 20 October 2012.
52  Shōtarō Yachi et al., “Sōkatsu zadankai—sōgōteki nichibei anzen hoshō kyōryoku ni mukete,” 
396–397.
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PRC will likely face a setback, including a challenge to its autocratic system.53 
These remarks reflect not only Yachi’s conservatism, but also his spiritual 
belief in the centrality of a country’s moral fibre and in the moral superiority 
of democratic systems. Yachi’s penchants and policy preferences were 
eventually condensed in the 2006 Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, which 
Yachi crafted with key MOFA personnel, such as Nobukatsu Kanehara.54
4. Secrecy and Secret Diplomacy: An Informal Source of Japanese 
Leadership
It was an informal process, secret diplomacy, which considerably aided the 
leverage enjoyed by formal political actors. The use of quiet and informal 
communication practices is a long-established tradition in Japanese 
diplomacy. After all, first-hand authoritative American accounts confirm that 
“Japanese negotiating behavior tends to exhibit a strong desire for 
confidentiality.”55 Slow-paced, pluralistic, consensus-driven negotiations 
defined by bureaucratic parochialism were often conducted away from public 
scrutiny and followed by ex post facto public explanations and theatrics 
following agreement. Blaker, Giarra, and Vogel suggest that Japanese 
negotiating behavior is hardly assertive and heavily bureaucratic in nature. 
Specific to US-Japan negotiations, MOFA would repeatedly act in a 
coordinating role and in a way subservient to the US position for trade and 
security matters.56 Nonetheless, evidence throughout postwar Japanese 
history highlights important exceptions that stress, in fact, the authority of 
prime ministers and their extensive use of personal emissaries and secret 
diplomacy in a clear top-down way.
After all, the secretive use of personal emissaries augments a political 
leader’s influence over the decision-making process. For instance, Yoshida 
Shigeru sent trusted bureaucrats and politicians to the US and the United 
Kingdom to ensure smooth communication over the conditions for a peace 
treaty, including political and economic relations with the Republic of China 
and the People’s Republic of China.57 This practice allowed Yoshida to 
circumvent MOFA and to engage in direct communication with his American 
counterparts. In fact, with regard to the negotiation of the Peace and Security 
53  Shōtarō Yachi et al., “Sōkatsu zadankai—sōgōteki nichibei anzen hoshō kyōryoku ni mukete,” 
415–417.
54  Pugliese, “Kantei Diplomacy? Japan’s Hybrid Leadership in Foreign and Security Policy.”
55  Patrick M. Cronin, “Conclusions,” in Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior, eds. Michael 
Blaker, Paul Giarra, and Ezra Vogel (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), 154.
56  Michael Blaker, Paul Giarra, and Ezra Vogel, eds., Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior.
57  Kokukin En (i.e., Yuan Keqin), Amerika to Nikka kōwa [The United States and the Japan-Republic 
of China Peace Treaty] (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2001), 121–122; Chōhin Chin, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku 
seisaku: 1950nendai higashi Ajia kokusai seiji no bunmyaku [Post-war Japan’s China Policy and East Asia‘s 
International Politics in the 1950s] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2000), 102–103.
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) P
ac
ific
 A
ffa
irs
. A
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: K
in
g's
 C
ol
le
ge
 L
on
do
n 
 IP
: 1
37
.7
3.
12
6.
18
8 
on
: T
hu
, 1
5 
Ju
n 
20
17
 1
1:
53
:5
0
243
Yachi Shōtarō: The State Behind the Curtain
Treaty, Yoshida made ample use of Shirasu Jirō, a businessman, who acted 
as Yoshida’s consigliore on foreign and security affairs.58 Japan was not a 
neutral country during the Cold War, and it allowed the stationing of US 
troops as part of the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty provisions. These details 
were also communicated through the offices of Shirasu, thus reinforcing 
Yoshida’s grip on security affairs and eventually leading to Japan’s recognition 
of the Republic of China.
Other Japanese leaders have pursued both formal and informal diplomatic 
overtures. Following Richard Nixon’s shocking announcement in August 
1971 of his plans to visit China, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku sent feelers to 
mainland China about a Japanese rapprochement as early as September of 
the same year. First, he assigned a political confidante with strong personal 
ties to the Satō family, Eguchi Masahiko, to approach the Chinese side 
through personal messages. But Satō and his secretary also wanted to quietly 
engage Beijing through formal channels, because the premier and his 
entourage did not fully trust Eguchi’s skills and words. For this purpose, he 
employed the craft of Okada Akira, the Japanese consul in Hong Kong and 
a maverick diplomat.59
Dual-track negotiation channels are important in another respect. In case 
negotiations are successful, the informal back channel allows for gentlemen’s 
agreements. For instance, the 1972 reversion of Okinawa was conducted 
through both formal and informal communication channels. However, Satō 
used Wakaizumi Kei as the sole trusted go-between for key aspects of the 
agreement, and the US counterpart was Kissinger himself. Along with the 
reversion of Okinawa, Wakaizumi negotiated secret protocols that granted 
the US military permission to station nuclear warheads in Okinawa and to 
allow their transit through the main islands. The secret agreements clashed 
with Satō’s 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles, according to which Japan 
“will not manufacture or possess nuclear weapons or allow their introduction 
into the country.” So secretive and controversial was the chasm between 
Satō’s overt “three non-nuclear principles” and his covert acceptance of 
Washington’s freedom to reintroduce nuclear warheads in Okinawa that no 
publicly available Japanese record would later substantiate Wakaizumi’s 
exposé.60 Wakaizumi’s machinations were virtually unknown until his own 
revelations in 1994, with the exception of key political advisors and other 
officials.
58  United States Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific. 
(Washington, DC, 1951), 810.
59  Masaya Inoue, Nicchū kokkō seijōka no seiji-shi [A Political History of the Normalization of Japan-
China Diplomatic Relations] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppansha, 2010), 471–475.
60  John Swenson-Wright, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available: A 
Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations, 1–16.
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4.1. Yachi’s and Abe’s Preference for Secrecy
The Yachi and Abe bond and their idiosyncratic use of secrecy embody the 
very continuity and centrality of formal actors in diplomatic affairs. After all, 
Satō Eisaku was Abe’s great-uncle and Yachi learnt from Wakaizumi the ropes 
of kuromaku diplomacy. Moreover, Yachi’s and Abe’s preference for secrecy 
closely resembled the Nixon-Kissinger duo, the undisputed masters of 
“backchannel diplomacy” and control over information flows. Yachi departed 
from the afore-mentioned emissaries because he also qualified as one of the 
premier’s most-respected strategists, underlying his Kissingerian qualities.
Evidence shows that Yachi came to appreciate the merits of deep control 
over information flow. According to several high-ranking officials, Yachi 
made repeated secret missions to China starting in 2005 and this practice 
continued during Abe’s second mandate. Specific to Sino-Japanese relations, 
Yachi, like Wakaizumi, preferred to bypass the reporting conventions of the 
Foreign Ministry and relied on keeping discussions with his Chinese 
counterparts secret. One actor not only testified to Yachi’s “famous capacity 
to disappear, as he did during our latest trip to China,” but also revealed that 
he had never learnt the specifics of the overt “Japan-China Comprehensive 
Policy Dialogue” (Nicchū sōgō seisaku taiwa: 2005–2007) because its content 
was never transmitted through diplomatic cables.61 Ambassador Miyamoto 
recognized Yachi’s role as essential in bringing about the 2006 détente, but 
claimed ignorance of important details on its contents: “I think Yachi will 
carry his secrets to the grave.”62
To be sure secrecy was paramount and aimed at maximizing the return 
on diplomatic investment: it shielded the talks from the opprobrium of leaks 
that would have aided foreign and domestic pressure groups, and aimed at 
a surprise effect to prop up the political leader’s standing in the political 
theatre. More importantly, secrecy would have allowed backroom deals, such 
as the likely covert promise for the premier not to visit Yasukuni; in fact, if 
this information were known the political life of Abe would have been over. 
As a result, quiet bilateral talks leading to Abe’s blitz Beijing summit meeting 
in October 2006 were fundamental in both regards. Yet, in 2014 the Abe 
administration strove for secrecy and pushed for a strict State Secrecy 
Protection Law.
After all, secrecy and informal diplomacy aid formal political actors in 
various ways. First, secrecy exemplified the penchant of Abe and Yachi for a 
quiet realpolitik: the Japanese government’s utmost discretion and tougher 
secrecy rules were aimed not only at harmful third-party actors, such as Russia 
and China, but even at “like-minded states,” whose “Five Eyes” espionage 
alliance granted the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
61  Interview under the condition of anonymity, written notes, Tokyo, date left out due to request 
of interviewee.
62  Yūji Miyamoto, former ambassador to Beijing, tape recording, 23 July 2013.
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undisputed hegemony over signal and human intelligence. Second, secret 
diplomatic endeavours, in turn, empowered Yachi’s own influence within 
the bureaucratic landscape and Abe’s standing in the political one. Like 
Nixon and Kissinger, they aimed to circumvent bureaucratic agencies, 
because they did not trust the apparatus, not unlike Nixon’s antipathy against 
agencies dominated by “Ivy League liberals.”63 Through an equally small 
group of advisers, their Japanese equivalents steered policy in their preferred 
direction, but at the cost of in-group bias. Third, secrecy over Yachi’s activities 
meant that he propped up his personal political influence from the vagaries 
of bureaucratic politics. In connection to that, secrecy shielded Abe and 
Yachi from failure and possible media criticism fuelled by strategic leaks. 
Finally, secrecy likely resulted from an elitist understanding of the public 
administration, one where Abe administration officials and policy 
practitioners held a patronizing view of what constituted the national interest: 
it needed to be protected from sensational media exposure and emotional 
general public scrutiny. As a result, the Abe administration’s preference for 
secrecy prevented access to important official records and impaired 
accountability in the decision-making system: 2013 Japanese legislation 
allowed the Yachi-led National Security Secretariat and the National Security 
Council to function without any obligation to record its minutes.64 Secrecy 
was paramount to Japan’s Kissinger and Nixon.
But how did policy change come about? The next section briefly details 
how the Yachi-centred foreign policy executive inaugurated a policy of China 
balancing centred in MOFA and, on the basis of that, negotiated the terms 
of the Sino-Japanese détente of 2006.
5. Negotiating with China from a Position of Strength: The Road to the 
2006 Détente
5.1. Sticks…: Yachi-led China Balancing Takes Shape within MOFA
Hailed as living proof of Japan’s diplomatic engagement of China in 2006, 
Kokubun Ryōsei highlights Yachi’s importance in holding meetings with his 
Chinese counterparts between 2005 and 2006 to resume top-level bilateral 
talks after Koizumi’s resignation.65 But, under the radar, Yachi proactively 
reorganized MOFA along his preferences for a balancing strategy that 
targeted China during the exact same period starting with his appointment 
63  Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: partners in power (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 78–86.
64  “Kakugi no gijiroku, hajimete kōkai—NSC ni mo sakusei gimu wo” [First-Ever Disclosure of 
Cabinet Minutes—Make the NSC Prepare Minutes Too], Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 22 April 2014.
65  Ryōsei Kokubun, “Nichi-Bei-Chū no rikigaku ni okeru nicchū kankei to higashi Ajia kyōdōtai” 
[Japan-China Relations and East Asian Community in the Context of Japan-US-China Power Relations], 
in Nichi-Bei-Chū toraianguru : sankakoku kyōchō e no michi [The Japan-US-China Triangle and the Road 
to Trilateral Cooperation], eds. Ryōsei Kokubun, Jisi Wang, and Gerald L. Curtis (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 2010), 32–47; 43–47.
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as administrative vice-minister (AVM) in January 2005. Yachi’s appointment 
as MOFA’s top bureaucrat in lieu of the more moderate Takeuchi Yukio 
provided momentum for Japan’s shift to China balancing. MOFA’s personnel 
and institutional overhaul under Abe’s watch as both chief cabinet secretary 
and premier points at the strategic use of his diplomatic consigliore’s 
administrative prerogatives.
A Yachi-led MOFA consistently pursued openings to India and other 
regional powers, as key strategic partners with which Japan aimed to enhance 
its position of strength as “important components of Japan’s overall strategy 
for dealing with the rise of China.”66 With initial strong coordination with 
the United States, Yachi prepared an institutional plan that prized South 
Asian diplomacy, setting up a new South Asian desk. Intelligence from the 
US embassy in Tokyo and authoritative insider accounts confirm the Yachi-
led stance in setting up the new department within the Asia and Oceanian 
Affairs Bureau. The spark was the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement in 2005 and the high priority assigned to India under the attention 
of CCS Abe and Asō.67
From Yachi’s personal memoirs it is claimed that the Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity (AFP) was a new pillar of Japan’s foreign policy, and that the 
concept was his idea. The AFP would have favoured the economic and 
political development of emerging economies and strategic states, stretching 
from Mongolia and the Korean Peninsula down to New Zealand, Australia, 
ASEAN, India, and up to Central Asia, the Baltic states and Scandinavia. 
Hence, the Eurasian “heartland” and “rimland” became pivotal. It did not 
include China, and indeed the arc orbited around the PRC, with the ill-
concealed strategic aim of encircling it, an impression addressed and not 
denied in Yachi’s memoir.68 The other notable absent actor, Russia, was 
explicitly mentioned as the target of renewed strategic overtures, in order 
to solve the long-standing dispute over the Southern Kuriles/Northern 
Territories and sign a peace treaty.69 Leaked cables confirm the rationale 
behind renewed efforts vis-à-vis Russia: “[avoiding] the risk that Moscow and 
Beijing might forge a closer strategic partnership—one that could provide 
unconstructive proposals. Japan hoped to drive a wedge between Russia and 
China.”70 Since the bold MOFA-led China balancing diplomatic agenda would 
slowly come into clearer shape around 2006, Yachi would lead negotiations 
66  US Embassy in Tokyo, “Ambassador’s Lunch with Shōtarō Yachi,” 6 March 2006, http://
wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06TOKYO1159.html.
67  Yoshikazu Shimizu, “Chūgoku mondai’ no uchimaku” [Behind the Scenes of the ‘China Problem’] 
(Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2008), 71–73; US Embassy in Tokyo, “MOFA reorganizes South Asia 
Department,” 7 April 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06TOKYO1886.html.
68  Yachi, Gaikō no senryaku to kokorozashi: zen gaimu jimu jikan Yachi Shōtarō wa kataru, 142–145; 
145.
69  Yachi, Gaikō no senryaku to kokorozashi: zen gaimu jimu jikan Yachi Shōtarō wa kataru, 88–103.
70  US Embassy in Tokyo, “Abe-Putin G-8 summit: Russia agrees to ‘accelerate’ talks on Northern 
Territories,” 14 June 2007, http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/06/07TOKYO2690.html.
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for the Japanese government to reset bilateral relations with China from a 
position of strength for Japan.
5.2. …and Carrots: Tit-for-Tat at the Japan-China Comprehensive Policy 
Dialogue
Following the strain in bilateral relations during the Koizumi years, and 
immediately after the April 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, 
China’s state councillor and Japan’s AVM inaugurated a “comprehensive 
policy dialogue” to manage future potential crises and refer bilateral 
developments to the respective leadership. The dialogue would really pick 
up momentum in spring 2006, however; according to former ambassador 
to China, Miyamoto Yūji, these talks played the most significant role in 
“cutting a new path in Sino-Japanese relations” by inaugurating the mutually 
beneficial relations along strategic interests, with Abe’s swift state visit to the 
PRC only days after assuming office in September 2006.71
Yachi was committed to resuming summit diplomacy for the sake of forging 
more stable bilateral relations and concluding negotiations on the joint 
development of the East China Sea (ECS). The goals were clear: halting 
unilateral gas drillings by Chinese companies on the east border of the 
Japan-claimed Exclusive Economic Zone in the ECS, and overcoming the 
politicization of the so-called history issue. Indicative of their limited 
engagement, Yachi underlines that by the time Chinese overtures in resuming 
bilateral summit diplomacy became clearer in May 2006, he and Abe had 
no desire to cement these positive trends by signing a fourth political 
document, unless China’s leadership demonstrated its overcoming of 
historical “finger-pointing.” China also acquiesced  to Japan’s ambiguous 
position on Taiwan, according to which Japan relinquishes sovereignty over 
the island, recognizes one China and fully understands China’s claim that 
Taiwan is an inalienable part of the mainland, in line with the 1972 joint 
communiqué.72
In other words, it was Yachi’s strategizing that led to the 2006 détente. In 
his memoirs, Yachi is adamant about the strategic use of the Yasukuni Shrine 
visits. A close reading hints at the logic of reciprocity, according to which 
concessions there were aimed at prompting openings from China on the 
history front and beyond. This logic governed the 2006 Japan-China 
“Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship” (SMBR) framework, but China 
agreed to major concessions when it eventually announced the agreement 
in principle on joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea in June 
2008, as acknowledged by top Japanese diplomat Yabunaka Mitoji.73 
Preliminary evidence, which will necessarily have to await the opening of 
71  Miyamoto, Korekara Chūgoku to dō tsukiauka, 123–125.
72  Yachi, Gaikō no senryaku to kokorozashi: zen gaimu jimu jikan Yachi Shōtarō wa kataru, 41–59.
73  Mitoji Yabunaka, Kokka no meiun [The Fate of the Nation] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2010), 148–149.
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diplomatic archives, suggests that Yachi and his MOFA task force engineered 
the terms of the 2008 Japan-China agreement in principle on joint 
development of ECS gas fields as part of the SMBR framework, as a 
continuation of the ongoing Japan-China comprehensive policy dialogue, 
which would eventually be headed by Yabunaka.74 In all likelihood, the 
China-sympathetic Fukuda administration agreed to postpone the deal’s 
announcement to assuage the Hu-Wen administration’s fears of a domestic 
backlash for the announcement of what amounted to a substantial political 
concession. On the contrary, Japanese leaders needed only to concede on 
a symbolic matter to ameliorate Japan-China political relations: visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. China decisively cooperated with Japan through a benign 
silence on this issue, at both the government and propaganda levels: silence 
on Abe’s revisionism and on the Yasukuni issue was also accompanied by 
public praise for postwar Japan’s peaceful path, as evident by the Chinese 
leadership’s substantial rhetoric change and the publicity accorded to 
soothing words towards Japan.75 In short, the Japan-China diplomatic 
framework negotiated by Yachi, his task force, and his Chinese counterparts 
led to the more confident détente of 2008. Then, Fukuda greeted President 
Hu Jintao in Tokyo and the two governments announced a new joint 
statement replete with lofty principles aimed at bilateral cooperation, but 
the agreement in principle on the ECS was the key deliverable. The above 
evidence demonstrates that Japanese diplomacy was highly effective in that 
instance, and that it also rested on a strategic use of its balancing overtures 
as a further incentive for Chinese concessions.
6. The 2014 Abe-Xi Handshake and a Sense of Déjà Vu?
Fast forward to the timide détente of 2014. In November of that year, quiet 
diplomacy paved the way for a compromise solution that saved face for both 
Abe and Xi. In April 2014 Xi sent Hu Deping, son of a former pro-Japan 
CCP secretary general, Hu Yaobang. On the Japanese side, former Prime 
Minister Fukuda Yasuo has played an active role in mending Sino-Japanese 
relations during the second Abe administration, retirement from active 
politics notwithstanding. In mid-2008, Fukuda’s soothing words and posture 
as a pro-China statesman were conducive to announcing a key China-Japan 
joint statement and in convincing the Chinese leadership to publicly endorse 
the aforementioned agreement in principle on joint development of gas 
fields in the ECS. In 2013 and 2014 Fukuda led several track II and track I 
dialogues between Tokyo and Beijing and has acted as an increasingly trusted 
74  Political correspondent of major Japanese daily newspaper, tape recording, Tokyo, 5 September 
2013; Japanese scholar, 11 January 2013.
75  Wen Jiabao, “Weile youyi yu hezuo” [For the Sake of Friendship and Cooperation], 12 April 
2007, Xinhuawang, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-04/12/content_5968135.htm; Yūji 
Miyamoto, Korekara Chūgoku to dō tsukiauka, 155–157.
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) P
ac
ific
 A
ffa
irs
. A
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: K
in
g's
 C
ol
le
ge
 L
on
do
n 
 IP
: 1
37
.7
3.
12
6.
18
8 
on
: T
hu
, 1
5 
Ju
n 
20
17
 1
1:
53
:5
0
249
Yachi Shōtarō: The State Behind the Curtain
go-between. Examples of Fukuda’s activities abound. In 2014 he represented 
Japan for the Japan-China-ROK wise men meeting aimed at reconciliation 
between the three countries; he has headed the Japanese side for the October 
2013 Beijing-Tokyo Forum, promoted by Genron NPO, but with careful 
oversight by the two governments; and he has spoken to Chinese leaders, 
including Xi Jinping, on many occasions, also in his capacity as chairman of 
China’s Boao Forum for Asia.76 Fukuda diplomacy seemingly validated the 
arguments in favour of informal Japanese actors in foreign policy making.
Yet, a close look at the underlying dynamics begs for a historical 
reassessment based on the Abe administration’s penchant for secrecy. It was 
later revealed that Yachi took part in meetings with CCP leaders, including 
the July 2014 meeting between Fukuda and Xi Jinping.77 Moreover, Yomiuri 
reporters in charge of political affairs reported that Yachi and his trusted 
task force secretly negotiated the joint Japan-China parallel statements 
announced in November 2014; according to them, Yachi’s trusted diplomat 
Akiba Takeo was in charge of the negotiation details in both 2006 and 2014, 
testifying again to the former AVM’s power.78 According to an engaged 
academic, official negotiations had actually started at the same time of Fukuda 
and senior LDP MPs’ travels to China, implicitly corroborating this essay’s 
analysis.79 Again, Chinese overtures would gain momentum only following 
more decisive balancing: it is not by chance that these followed US President 
Barack Obama’s April 2014 reassurance that the Senkaku/Diaoyu fall into 
the provisions of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Abe and Yachi were acting 
on the understanding that Chinese policy makers respected strength.
In exchange for a timid handshake and a shallow bilateral rapprochement, 
China requested Japan’s acknowledgement of a territorial dispute, and 
assurances regarding prime-ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In fact, 
Japan and China were still at loggerheads on fundamental matters: Japan 
did not formally recognize the existence of a territorial dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and China continued sending official vessels. 
However, almost three years into the announcement, Abe has made no 
pilgrimage to the controversial war shrine. Preliminary evidence suggests 
that history echoed through Sino-Japanese interaction. After all, Yachi was 
quietly in charge of early contact with Chinese counterparts as early as 2013 
76  “Fukuda moto shushō to Shū shuseki ga kaidan” [Former Premier Fukuda Met with Secretary 
Xi], Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 April 2013; “Nicchūkan kenjin kaigi, kankei shūfuku e kōki ikase, 11 gatsu 
APEC-muke taiwa o” [Japan-China-ROK Wise-men Meeting, Revive the Opportunity for a Resumption 
of Relations, Towards a Dialogue at the November APEC Meeting], Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 23 April 
2014.
77  “Abe dispatched senior bureaucrat Yachi to Fukuda-Xi meeting in Beijing,” Japan Times, 12 
October 2014; “Confidant of Xi met with Abe in Tokyo to smooth bilateral relations,” Asahi Shinbun, 
15 April 2014.
78  Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, Abe Kantei vs. Shū Kinpei [Abe’s Kantei versus Xi Jinping], (Tokyo: 
Shinchō-sha, 2015), 36–39.
79  Shin Kawashima, “Nicchū kankei wa dō susumu no ka” [How Will Japan-China Relations 
Progress?], Tōa, no. 583 (January 2016): 11; 10–20.
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and his early role in resetting bilateral relations in 2006 suggests that he also 
played a more active role in 2014. At the same time, it is worth stressing 
(again) that only the opening of diplomatic archives, and the publication 
of personal memoirs will reveal Yachi’s role vis-à-vis Fukuda’s. It is very possible 
that the Japanese government used a multiplicity of tracks to engage China 
in 2014. Although Abe’s well-documented testy relationship with Fukuda 
invites suspicion, it is quite likely that the former statesman acted on behalf 
of formal actors, for the sake of Sino-Japanese stability and possibly in 
exchange for a promise from Abe to tone down his historical revisionism.
As the head of the National Security Secretariat, Yachi was responsible, 
through his task force, for negotiating the terms for the shallow 2014 détente 
with his Chinese counterparts. That the Japanese government inaugurated 
a “High-Level Political Dialogue” with Beijing—this time not from a position 
of undeniable politico-economic strength, however—reinforced the sense of 
déjà vu with the earlier talks under the “Japan-China Comprehensive Policy 
Dialogue” framework. Diplomatic overtures were integrated into Japan’s 
strategic security policy. Interestingly, the Chinese government reserved an 
“unprecedented reception” for Yachi during his three-day visit in mid-July 
2015. The five-hour dialogue with State Councilor Yang Jiechi was followed 
by meetings with Defense Chief Chang Wanquan and with Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang in the heart of Chinese policy making, Zhongnanhai.80 These meetings 
implied that China appreciated Yachi as the key agent behind Japan’s China 
policy. After all, Yachi-led quiet diplomacy became Abe’s instrument of choice 
towards Russian and South Korean engagement in 2015 and 2016,81 thus 
pointing at the relevance of this article’s arguments.
7. Conclusions
Yachi has been a relatively under-appreciated protagonist of Japanese foreign 
policy, not least because of the Abe administration’s sympathies for a foreign 
and security policy clouded in secrecy. This article has provided a portrait of 
Yachi, new in both the English- and Japanese-language literature, with an 
accent on his Kissingerian qualities: a preference for strategy, geopolitics, and 
secret diplomacy. Yet Yachi’s hyper-empowered role was possible precisely 
because of the seemingly presidential premiership of Abe, Japan’s Nixon. 
Moreover, the Abe government’s institutionalization of secrecy within the 
80  “Chūgoku, Nihon no kōkan ni irei no kōgū—Ri shushō ga anpokyoku-chō to kaidan” [China, 
Unprecedented Reception Accorded to High-ranking Japanese Official—Premier Li meets Head of 
National Security Secretariat], Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 17 July 2015.
81  “Roshia no tai-nichi gaikō kīman KGB shusshin Patorushefu-shi & chinichi-ha Wain-shi” 
[Keypersons in Russia’s Japan Diplomacy: former KGB Patrushev and Japan expert Vaino], Sankei 
Shinbun, 16 December 2016; Sōichi Tsukamoto, “Nikkan, ianfu mondai kaiketsu de gōi – Kitachōsen 
ga kaku jikken” [Japan and South Korea agree on comfort women resolution, North Korea carries 
out nuclear test], Tōa, no. 584 (February 2016): 64–65.
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newly minted National Security Council and through the State Secrecy 
Protection Law will further deepen the opaqueness over the conduct of public 
affairs in Japan. Exacerbated by the ongoing geopolitical tensions in East Asia 
and sense of crisis—especially felt among the conservative politico-bureaucratic 
establishment—the above institutional developments will likely further 
strengthen the role of the nation-state in Japan. It is telling that Yomiuri Shinbun 
journalists responsible for extensive reporting of Japan’s international 
relations conclude their latest collection of articles on the Kantei-led China 
policy with a recognition of the increased hardships in reporting diplomatic 
affairs. In fact, many of the official sources interviewed by Yomiuri would 
decline to go into details for fear of incurring harsh punishment for divulging 
“diplomatic secrets.”82 As the extensive case study of the 2006 rapprochement 
and the preliminary evidence of recent Sino-Japanese interaction have shown, 
Japanese overtures were deeply embedded in the government’s broader 
strategic approach towards China. Moreover, Japanese informal actors may 
often act in ways complementary to, if not at the behest of, governmental 
ones. It is all the more significant that it is an informal process, that of secret 
diplomacy, that props up governmental actors’ agency.
King’s College London, London, United Kingdom, March 2017
82  Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, Abe Kantei vs. Shū Kinpei, 282.
